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This paper studies a model of car replacement designed to evaluate
policies addressed to inﬂuence replacement decisions. An aggregate
hazard function is computed from optimal replacement rules of hetero-
geneous consumers, which mimics the hump–shaped hazard function
observed for the Spanish car market. The model is calibrated to evalu-
ate quantitatively the Plan Prever, a replacement scheme introduced in
Spain in 1997, ﬁnding that the positive eﬀect of the subsidy is high in
the short run but small in the long run for both sales and the average
age of the stock.




Over the past recent years, Spanish governments have introduced some
policy measures aimed at increasing road safety, reducing environ-
mental pollution and stimulating car sales by the mean of subsidizing
car replacement. We refer to these policies as replacement schemes.
The aim of this paper is to study the main eﬀects of such schemes
on car sales and on the average age of the stock. To this end, we
solve a model of car replacement with a continuum of ex–ante hetero-
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during a visit of the second author to the Universit´ e Catholique de Louvain.geneous consumers, where the individual decision to replace is endo-
genous and depends on car’s age. The aggregate behavior of sales is
computed trough explicit aggregation of individual replacement rules.
Among other things, we show that the presence of an age threshold —
as is the case in several implemented replacement schemes, the Spanish
included—, has the puzzling implication that some car owners optim-
ally delay replacement, although a large fraction of them advance it,
as aimed. Finally, the proposed model is used to simulate the eﬀects
of the replacement scheme, known as Plan Prever, introduced in Spain
in 1997. We ﬁnd that this policy increases notably new car sales in the
short run, but in the long run the eﬀect on sales and in the average age
of the stock is small: with respect to the previous level, a transitory
increase of around 16% in sales should follow the introduction of the
subsidy, whereas in the long run a permanent increase of about 1.2%
in car sales, and a permanent reduction of 8% in the average age of
the stock of cars —from 8.7 to 8 years— should be observed.
Several reasons can be given to justify the ﬁnite lifetime of cars and
their replacement. Some of them, which we call technical obsolescence,
have to do with depreciation associated with usage or failures gener-
ated by some stochastic events. Others are related to economic factors,
like technical progress, which induces the replacement of an old car by
a new, more eﬃcient one, even when the old car is still technically op-
erative. This could be termed economic obsolescence. In this paper,
we include both types of factors in an stylized fashion.
The eﬃcacy of car replacement schemes has been already analyzed.
Hahn (1995) and Baltas and Xepapadeas (1999), among others, focus
on the environmental consequences of this type of policy. A diﬀerent
perspective is adopted by Adda and Cooper (2000), who analyze the
French case focusing exclusively on the sales eﬀect of the replacement
subsidy. They embed a dynamic replacement model into a structural
estimation procedure in the vein of Rust (1987).
This paper focuses on car sales and adopts a structural framework,
but it diﬀers in several aspects from Adda and Cooper (2000). Firstly,
they assume that consumers face idiosyncratic shocks in preferences
and income, uncorrelated both across time and consumers. In this
paper, however, we assume persistent heterogeneity in preferences. In
this sense, both approaches can be understood as two extreme cases
of heterogeneity. Adda and Cooper also consider an age threshold to
take advantage of the replacement subsidy, but contrary to our result,
2it has no consequences on aggregate purchases. Secondly, we work in
continuous time building a model in line with the real options liter-
ature and this, joint with our assumption about consumer preferences
and heterogeneity, allows us to get an explicit expression for the re-
placement age as a function of diﬀerent factors aﬀecting replacement.
Finally, given the low time interval covered by our database, we calib-
rate the model in contrast to Adda and Cooper’s Generalized Method
of Moments estimation procedure.
The remaining work is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a
description of the replacement schemes adopted in Spanish during the
1990’s —in particular the Plan Prever— and some empirical evidence
on car replacement for Spain. Section 3 describes a replacement model
at the individual as well as at the aggregate level. It also studies the
eﬀects of introducing a replacement scheme on the replacement age.
Section 4 is devoted to the calibration of the model on Spanish car
market data. Section 5 quantiﬁes the main eﬀects of the Prever scheme
both on car sales and on the average age of the stock, and reports some
robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2. Car Replacement and Replacement Schemes in Spain1
Several measures have been introduced during recent years by Spanish
governments to promote car replacement. The ﬁrst was the introduc-
tion of compulsory periodic inspection in 1987, a mechanism that not
only reinforces compliance with certain technical standards but also
promotes car replacement by increasing the cost of maintaining aging
cars. More recently, car replacement has been directly encouraged by
the replacement schemes Renove I (1994), Renove II (1994–1995) and
Prever —initiated in 1997 and still in force. Both programs have the
purpose of lowering the average age of the stock of cars on the road,
with subsequent positive eﬀects on the road safety and the environ-
ment. To this end they give a subsidy to the acquisition of a new car
provided that a car older than a given age is deregistered and scrapped
by the same owner. Plan Renove I was in eﬀect from April 12 to Oc-
tober 12, 1994. Plan Renove II applied from October 12, 1994 to June
30, 1995. Plan Prever started in April 11, 1997 and is of indeﬁnite
duration. Although it suﬀered recent modiﬁcations, during the ﬁrst
two years, the period to which we restrict our empirical analysis, Plan
1The data and Gauss code used in this paper to calibrate and simulate the model can
be downloaded from http://oro1.usc.es/˜aesamp/prever.zip.
3Prever reduced the new vehicle registration tax2 by 480 euros if the
scrapped car was aged 10 years or more. The subsidy has the vehicle
registration tax as an upper bound. Table 1 summarizes the main
elements characterizing these replacement schemes.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
To analyze the eﬀects of replacement schemes, we use annually recor-
ded data by Direcci´ on General de Tr´ aﬁco (DGT). Data are given at
December 31st and for one–year periods. Using this information, we






where Bτ(I) represents reported deregistration of cars aged I in year
τ and Pτ−1(I − 1) denotes the stock of cars aged I − 1 at the end of
year τ − 1. We compute the stock at the end of year τ starting from
a reported initial stock at 1969, and the number of registered cars
and deregistered cars for each age for successive years —see Appendix
A1 for details. Figures 1 and 2 show these hazard rates for several
years, as well as the average for the periods 1988–1993 and 1994–1996
which are used below for calibration purposes. It is worth noting that
observed hazard rates are hump shaped.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
The main diﬀerence between the two Renove schemes and the Plan
Prever is that the later one is permanent whereas the former were
temporary. As shown in Licandro and Sampayo (1997b), the tem-
porary character precludes any long run eﬀect of the scheme on car
sales, as the positive initial eﬀect is compensated with a subsequent
negative eﬀect once the subsidy disappears. As Figure 1 shows, the
hazard moved up signiﬁcantly in 1994, during the introduction of the
Renove scheme and moved down in 1996 —the Renove scheme ﬁn-
ished in the middle of 1995—, below the 1993 hazard. On the basis
of the 1993–1996 observed aggregate hazard rates for deregistration
2New cars sales in Spain are taxed with two indirect ad–valorem taxes. The ﬁrst is
the value–added tax (Impuesto sobre el Valor A˜ nadido, IVA). The second is known
as the registration tax. At the time of the Prever scheme, the IVA was 16% and the
registration tax 7% for small–medium car engine power and 12% for medium–high
car engine power —with some exceptions for Canarias, Ceuta and Melilla.
4of Spanish cars, Licandro and Sampayo (1997b) found that a rise in
car sales by about 120,000 units prompted by Renove I during 1994
was followed by a subsequent fall in 1996 —in 1995 Renove II helped
to maintain sales roughly at 1993 levels. Unlike Renove I an II, the
Prever scheme is of indeﬁnite duration, implying that no depression in
sales following the rise induced by its introduction should be expected.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Table 2 shows some data on car stock and replacement for 1997 and
1998 as well as the averages for 1988–1993 and 1994–1996 —see also
Figure 3. The stock growth rates are very similar to the average ob-
served for the period 1988–1993. The annual deregistration rates for
1997 and 1998 are also close to the average for 1988–1993. Although
this might suggest that, contrary to expectations, the Prever scheme
has had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on this variable —whereas Renove I had
boosted the 1994 deregistration rate to 4.2%—, Figure 2 shows that
the observed average deregistration hazard function for 1997–1998 lies
above the same average for the periods 1988–1993 and 1994–1996.
Moral Rinc´ on (1998) uses the same data set to analyze aggregate scrap-
ping decisions in the Spanish car market. She estimates aggregate
hazard rates adopting a reduced econometric framework, ﬁnding that
car’s age is the main determinant of observed scrapping. She also
ﬁnds a positive eﬀect of Plan Renove on the hazards. In contrast, we
use a theoretical model to quantify the eﬀects of Plan Prever on sales
and the average age of the stock, through the mean of its eﬀect on
the aggregate hazards. We show that monotonic increasing hazards
at the individual level combined with heterogeneity among owners can
generate non monotonic hazards at the aggregate level that mimic the
observed hazards for cars in Spain.
3. The Model
Although we adopt a microeconomic perspective as a starting point
for the analysis of replacement decisions, only aggregate data on car
replacement are available. At the individual level, hazard functions
are expected to be increasing for both technical and economic reasons.
As it is shown below, the model in this paper delivers idiosyncratic
stepwise hazard functions.
5However, as can be observed in Figures 1 and 2, aggregate hazard func-
tions for car replacement are hump–shaped. At an aggregate level, to
highlight the dependence of car replacement on age, a hazard rate per-
spective is very useful as some previous work show —see for instance
Caballero and Engel (1993) or Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999).
However, as these authors also point out, although at the individual
level hazard rates are expected to be monotonic increasing functions,
non monotonic hazard rates can result in the aggregate, provided there
is enough heterogeneity. In this paper, and in order to replicate the
Spanish aggregate hazards for cars, we introduce inter–individual dif-
ferences in preferences that generate heterogeneity in replacement age.
This allows us to generate a cross–sectional density of replacement age,
which is the link between idiosyncratic stepwise hazard functions and
hump–shaped aggregate empirical hazards. In this section, we ﬁrst de-
scribe and solve the individual replacement problem and analyze the
eﬀects of a replacement scheme on individual replacement. Then, we
study the aggregate consequences of individual behavior.
3.1. The Microeconomic Replacement Problem
Time is continuous. There is a continuum of heterogeneous consumers
with preferences θeγtc(t) + s(t − a(t)) deﬁned on nondurable con-
sumption c and durable goods services s. For simplicity, consumers
own one and only one car. Services of a car bought at time t − a are
deﬁned as s(t − a) = eγ(t−a) where eγt measures instantaneous services
provided by a new car bought at time t, and a ≥ 0 is car’s age. The
growth rate of new car quality is given by γ > 0. The utility of non-
durable consumption is linear with marginal utility θeγt. We assume
that θ ∈ [0,θmax], so that consumers are diﬀerent in their marginal
utility of nondurables consumption.3 Note that we are also assuming
that marginal utility of nondurables consumption and quality of new
cars are growing at the same rate, which allows us to obtain a con-
stant replacement age. Otherwise, the optimal replacement age would
converge to zero as time goes to inﬁnity. Finally, each consumer is
3Although here utility is linear and all consumers have the same income, allowing
for diﬀerent values of θ makes consumers with lower θ have a lower marginal utility
of income. As is shown in Tirole (1988), pp. 96–97, in a similar context, this can
be interpreted as if utility is concave in nondurables consumption and consumers
have diﬀerent income and therefore, diﬀerent marginal rates of substitution between
income and durables services.
6endowed with a ﬂow of exogenous income y measured in nondurable
units.
Let us assume that all new cars have the same quality and can be
purchased at a constant price p. The scrapping value of an old car is
d0. Therefore, p−d0 > 0 is the car replacement cost which is assumed
to be exogenous. Further, a car may suﬀer an irreparable failure with
probability δ > 0, constant and exogenous, that forces the owner to
replace the car by a new one. The existence of a second hand market
is ignored.
In Appendix A2, the consumer’s control problem is transformed into an
equivalent stationary recursive problem. The optimal replacement age
can be obtained as the solution to the following dynamic programming
problem:
W (a) = max{V (a), V (0) − θ(p − d0)}, [1]
where V (a) reﬂects the instantaneous value of owning a car of age a,
and V (0) − θ(p − d0) represents the value of replacing a car of age
a by a new car. Notice that the replacement cost p − d0 is weighted
by the marginal utility of nondurables consumption, θ. The optimal
consumer’s strategy is to keep the car whenever a belongs to the “con-
tinuation region” [0,T) and reinitialize the variable a to its initial
value a = 0 —replace the car— at cost θ(p − d0) whenever a ≥ T.
As the replacement age T is endogenous, this is a free boundary value
problem.
Let ρ > 0 deﬁne the rate of time preference. As is shown in Ap-
pendix A2.1, the following assumptions guarantee that the previous
replacement problem makes sense giving rise to a ﬁnite and nonnegat-
ive replacement age.
Assumption 1. γ < δ + ρ.
Assumption 2. 0 ≤ θ < 1
(δ+ρ)(p−d0).
Assumption 1 guarantees that utility is bounded and is also required
for the optimal replacement age T be strictly positive for θ > 0. As-
sumption 2 can be written as θ(p − d0) < 1
(δ+ρ). This inequality says
that the replacement cost times the marginal utility of nondurables,
must be less than the discounted services of a car with an expected
inﬁnite lifetime. This assumption implies that the replacement age is
7bounded above. Under these assumptions, the optimal replacement









δ + ρ − γ
!
≡ θ(T;α0), [2]
where α0 = {ρ,p,d0,γ,δ}.
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
Since the function θ(T;α0) deﬁned in [2] is a monotonic function of
T, for T ≥ 0 it can be inverted to give T as a function of θ:
T = T(θ;α0) ≡ θ−1 (θ;α0). [3]
The thick line in Figure 4 represents the replacement age function. It
must be noted that this function does not have an explicit expression
and, as it is crucial to our model, this forces us to make computations
numerically. The function T(θ;α0) allows us to deﬁne θmax as the
type such that Tmax = T(θmax;α0), where Tmax is the highest age at
which someone is observed to deregister a car. Therefore, we restrict
the study of the replacement behavior to θ ∈ [0,θmax] where θmax <
1
(δ+ρ)(p−d0).
Concerning the comparative statics of the replacement age with respect
to the parameters, the following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 1. For θ ∈ ]0,θmax], the replacement age is increasing
with respect to p − d0 and ρ + δ, and decreasing with respect to γ.








and is always positive.
To check the sign of derivatives with respect to γ or ρ + δ, it is useful
to write [2] in integral form as follows

















(z − T)eγ(z−T)e−(δ+ρ)z dz.
8The integrand is the product of three functions which are continuous
in the closed interval [0,T]. The ﬁrst function (z − T) is negative in
the open interval (0,T) and the other two are positive, implying that
the derivative is negative.














In this case, the integrand is the product of three positive functions
in the open interval (0,T) which are continuous in the closed interval
[0,T]. Therefore the derivative is positive.
First, Proposition 1 states that replacement age is increasing with the
replacement cost (p − d0). This cost can increase both because the
price of new cars, p, increases and because the scrapping value, d0,
decreases. In both cases the eﬀect is the same and increases the re-
placement age. Second, concerning the eﬀect of δ on the replacement
age, equation [4] makes clear that the failure rate acts on the replace-
ment age in the same way as the discount factor. This is usual in
dynamic models where uncertainty is governed by a Poisson process
as here. That is, an increase in the probability of a car failure reduces
the expected present value of future gains from replacement, which
are deﬁned as the gain in services at each age times the probability of
survival up to this age. Third, the eﬀect of technical progress on the
replacement age can be better understood by looking also at equation
[4]: the replacement age is the value that equalizes the subjective re-
placement cost —on the left hand side— with the expected gain in
durable services on the right hand side. This gain is computed as the
discounted diﬀerence between the services provided by the newest and
the oldest car in the economy, at each moment during the lifetime of
the former. If technical progress increases, the distance between the
services provided by both cars (the technological frontier) increases.
As the replacement cost remains unaltered, reducing the replacement
age restores equality in [4] by increasing the relative services of the
oldest car in the economy and lowering the time over which this dif-
ference is computed. This is the mechanism through which embodied
technical progress relates inversely to the replacement age and gen-
erates (economic) obsolescence of cars that are otherwise technically
useful.
9Finally, it is worth noting that the replacement behavior characterized
above can be understood as a step hazard function: the conditional
probability of replacement is constant and equal to the failure rate
δ for age up to the optimal replacement value, and equal to one for
higher values of age.
– The Eﬀects of a Replacement Scheme on the Replacement Age
Let us assume that the replacement scheme, adopted at time t0, is a
subsidy s > 0 for cars aged at least T > 0. Consequently, the para-
meter vector α changes from its former value α0 to α1 = {ρ,p,d0 + s,γ,δ},
conditional on the car being replaced at an age at least equal to T.
The replacement problem with subsidy is solved in Appendix A3 where
Lemma A3.1 establishes the existence of a type θ which is indiﬀerent
between taking advantage of the subsidy or not. As a by–product,
this lemma also proves that: i) for consumers with θ < θ the re-
placement age is given by function T (θ;α0) as deﬁned in equation [3],
implying that consumers with θ < θ do not change their behavior; ii)





used to replace at age T (θ;α0) < T but are induced by the
scheme to delay replacement to take beneﬁt of the subsidy. The fol-
lowing proposition completes the analysis of the replacement decision
for the remaining types and summarize the results —the proof is also
in Appendix A3.
Proposition 2. The optimal replacement rule under subsidy s > 0





T (θ;α0) if θ < θ
T if θ ≤ θ ≤ θ










Function T (θ;·) in Proposition 2 has been previously deﬁned in equa-
tion [3]. Figure 4 represents the optimal scrapping function ˆ T(θ;α0,s,T).
Firstly, all consumers with θ > θ would like to reduce the lifetime of
cars to take advantage of the subsidy. Secondly, some among them,
those with θ < θ < θ, would be induced by the subsidy to reduce
the scrapping age below T, but that is not allowed by the replace-
ment scheme. They replace then at age T. Thirdly, consumers with
θ < θ had a replacement age smaller than T before the introduction
10of the replacement scheme. However, some of them, those such that
θ ≤ θ ≤ θ, have incentives to delay their replacement to take advantage
of the subsidy. Fourth, consumers with θ < θ do not have incentives
to modify their behavior and replace at age T(θ;α0).
Although Proposition 1 establishes that a replacement subsidy reduces
the replacement age, Proposition 2, the main theoretical result of the
paper, stresses the fact that the existence of an age threshold induces
a mass of owners with an otherwise heterogenous replacement age to
concentrate replacement at the age threshold. On the one side, some
car owners reduce their replacement age just to this limit. On the
other side, the subsidy induces some car owners to delay replacement
to take advantage of the subsidy. The quantitative importance of the
delay eﬀect depends on the distribution of the stock of cars around
the age threshold. However, this result brings attention to the fact
that, in implementing this type of policy, the intended reduction of
the average age of the stock of cars can be partly oﬀset.
3.2. Aggregation




N(t,θ) dθ + N∞(t),
where N(t,θ) denotes the number of individuals of type θ ∈ [0,θmax].
As each owner owns a single car and he must replace it in order to buy
a new one, N (t) also measures the number of cars in the economy.
Replacement decisions of individuals of type θ ∈ [0,θmax] are governed
by the rules described in the previous section. In addition, there is
another group of car owners that never deregister their cars. They are
denoted by N∞(t) and referred as type–inﬁnity. The members of this
latter group, which largely represents individuals who in reality fail
to deregister upon sending their cars to scrap, only buy a new car if
forced to do so by an irreparable failure. The size of each group of
consumers is assumed to be growing at the rate n > 0, which is taken
to be exogenous and constant. Under these assumptions, population is
distributed according to the stationary density function ζ (θ), verifying
Z θmax
0
ζ(θ) dθ + ζ∞ = 1,
with ζ∞ representing the fraction of type–inﬁnity car owners.
11Assuming one car per individual implies that the deregistration of a
car is automatically followed by the purchase of a new car, regardless of
whether deregistration is forced by irreparable failure or is the result of
a decision to replace a car that is aging and road worthless. Therefore,
the following equations must be veriﬁed,
Z t
t−T(θ;α)
M(z,θ;α) e−δ(t−z) dz = ζ (θ)N(t), ∀θ ∈ [0,θmax], [5]
Z t
−∞
M∞(z;α) e−δ(t−z) dz = ζ∞N(t), [6]
where M (t,θ;α) and M∞(t;α) denote the number of cars bought at
time t by each consumer type, for a given parameters vector α.
From [5], cars bought by type θ car owners less than T(θ;α) years ago
have not yet been replaced except for car wrecks. The term e−δ(t−z)
represents the rate of consumers that having bought a car at moment
z have not suﬀer a failure yet. In addition, those consumers that
bought a car more than T(θ;α) years ago have already replaced it
and, therefore, we only consider car registrations from t − T(θ;α) on.
Taking time derivatives in [5] gives
M(t,θ;α) = M(t − T(θ;α),θ;α) e−δ T(θ;α) + (δ + n)ζ (θ)N(t), [7]
the ﬁrst term on the right hand side representing unforced replace-
ment of cars bought at time t − T(θ;α) —economic obsolescence—
, the second replacements forced by irreparable failure —technical
obsolescence—, and the growth of the population of individuals of
type θ.
Concerning type–inﬁnity consumers, from [6]
M∞(t;α) = (δ + n) ζ (θ)N(t).
The total number of car registrations at time t, which we denote as




M(t,θ;α) dθ + M∞(t;α). [8]
4. Calibrating the Model
The model is calibrated in order to simulate the eﬀects of Plan Prever
on aggregate car sales and on the average age of the stock. The distri-
bution of car buyers by type ζ (θ) is calibrated in order to match the
12average aggregate hazard rates for car replacement during the period
1988–1993. The period 1988–1996 deﬁnes a cycle on car sales, but we
exclude the period 1994–1996 since in these years the Renove schemes
were in practice, introducing severe distortions on hazard rates, as can
be observed in Figure 1. This calibration is done conditional on the
following numerical values for the remaining parameters:
i) For the failure rate, we take δ = 0.0014 from the observed average
hazard rate for cars aged less than one year for the period 1988–
1993.
ii) The population growth rate is assumed to be n = 0.04, the average
growth rate of the stock during the period 1988–1993.
iii) Concerning technical progress, we rely on Izquierdo, Licandro and
Maydeu (2001). They ﬁnd that the increase in car’s quality, meas-
ured as the diﬀerence between the oﬃcial car price index and a
quality adjusted price of cars, from January 1997 to December
2000, was 3.1% per year. Consequently, we take γ = 0.031.
iv) The price of new cars is normalized to one, since equation [2] does
not change if divided by p.
v) The scrapping value is taken to be d0 = 0.012.4
vi) As the discount rate, we take ρ = 0.08.
These numerical values, in particular the scrapping value and the dis-
count rate, are arbitrary. The sensitivity of the analysis to some of
these parameters is discussed in Section 5.
In this section, we ﬁrstly derive the theoretical relationship between
the hazard function and the population distribution. Secondly, we use
the observed aggregate hazard function to calibrate the population
distribution.
4.1. Aggregate Hazard Rates and the Population Distribution
Under the assumption that the economy is in a steady state, car pur-
chases must be growing at the population growth rate, for all types.
This allows us to write equation [7] as follows:5
4The average price of new cars in the 1990 Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares
(EPF), the Spanish consumers survey, is 9,934 euros. Taking this value as reference,
d0 = 0.012 implies a scrapping price of around 120 euros.
5For n = δ = 0, we have M(t,θ;α0) =
N(t,θ)
T(θ;α0), implying that car registrations of type




1 − e−(δ+n) T(θ;α0)

ζ (θ)N(t). [9]
Let us deﬁne the stationary density function for car sales as m(θ;α0) =
M(t,θ;α0)
M(t;α0) for θ ∈ [0,θmax], with total sales M(t;α0), and type θ pur-
chases M(t,θ;α0), deﬁned in [8] and [9], respectively. There is an
indirect map between ζ (θ) and aggregate hazard rates which is de-
rived into the three steps summarized below —see Appendix A4 for
more details.





1 − e−(δ+n) T(θ;α0)

Λ(α0) + 1 − M(θmax;α0)
, [10]
where Λ(α0) is the integral of the numerator of equation [10] on the
interval [0,θmax], and M(θmax;α0) denotes the distribution function
corresponding to the density m(θ;α0) and evaluated at θmax.





where f(T;α0) denotes the unconditional density function for car scrap-
ping age.
Third, the aggregate hazard rate for cars aged T is










− (h(T;α0) − δ)

f(T;α0). [13]
Therefore, as h(T;α0) can be computed using available information
for hazard rates, solving equation [13] function f(T;α0) can also be
computed and then, using expressions [10] and [11], ζ(θ) can be ob-
tained.
when population grows and cars crash, the relationship is more complex, as equation
[9] shows.
144.2. Calibrating the Population Distribution
As we restrict to the period 1988–1993 for calibration, we are forced
to consider only hazard rates from age 0 to 28, the range for which
data are available in this period. The observed hazard function, for
integer values of time τ and age I = {0,1,...28}, hτ(I), is deﬁned
and computed using oﬃcial annual data as indicated in Section 2 and
A1. It is worth noting that the recorded annual deregistration data
constitute a smoothed version of Bτ(I), since cars recorded as of age
I years when deregistered in year τ, may in fact have any age between
I − 1 —if registered on December 31st, year τ − I and deregistered
on January 1st, year τ—, and I + 1 years —if registered on January
1st year τ − I and deregistered on December 31st, year τ. This is
important as we are modelling replacement decisions in continuous
time. However, we are forced to ignore this smoothing as there are
no data on deregistration of cars for shorter periods. This assumption






which, applied in particular to the last interval, implies Tmax = 28.5.
We match the model hazard, h(T;α0), to the average of annual hazards






hτ(I), for I = {0,1,...28}.
A continuous time approximation of the average, scaled up to annual







for T = I, and interpolating cubic splines6 for a grid of intermediate
values of T. In Figure 5 the line represents the calibrated distribution,
h(T;α0), and the observed hazard rates, h(I), are drawn as dots.
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
With the calibrated function h(T;α0) in hand, we obtain f(T;α0) by
solving equation [13] numerically with the initial condition f(0;α0) =
h(0;α0) − δ = 0. The numerical integration of the function f(T;α0),
shown in Figure 6, yields F(28.5) ≈ 0.7, i.e. a new car has about a
30% probability of not being deregistered in the following 28.5 years.
6For interpolation we take h(T;α0) = h(28) for T ∈ [28,28.5[.
15Finally, to obtain ζ (θ) —Figure 7— we use equations [10] and [11]. In-
tegration of the function ζ (θ) shows that about half of the population
of car owners are type–inﬁnity and never deregister their cars. Al-
though data are about oﬃcial car deregistration this evidence might
indicate that not all scrapped cars are deregistered, pointing out a
measurement problem.
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE
5. Policy Simulations
We use the model to quantify the eﬀects of the Prever scheme. To
mimic it, we take s = 0.048, i.e. a subsidy of 4.8% (480 euros) of
the new car price, and T = 10. On a ﬁrst step, we compute the new




, see Figure 4. Figure 8 shows the
diﬀerence between the new replacement age and the original one, as a
function of the latter. The change in T ranges between about 1.77 and
−1.2 years. This justiﬁes the use of a continuous time framework, since
it shows that serious errors might have arisen from using a discrete time
model based on annual periods, the period for which oﬃcial data are
compiled.
INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE
The replacement scheme brings about two qualitatively diﬀerent ef-
fects: a transitory eﬀect and a permanent eﬀect. Let us ﬁrst describe
the transitory eﬀect. It may be that at time t0, when the replace-
ment scheme is introduced, some individuals of type θ > θ own cars
aged more than ˆ T(θ;α0,s,T). As can be seen in Figure 4, for any age
T > T, immediate replacement may be to the advantage of car owners
of types θ between θ(T;α0) and θ(T;α1). The transitory eﬀect, for








(δ + n) e−(δ+n)TN (t0)ζ(θ)
1 − e−(δ+n) T(θ,α0) dθ,
16where θ∗(T;α1) = min{θ(T;α1),θmax}.7 The second line has been
derived under the assumption that the economy was in a stationary
state before time t0 and using therefore equation [9]. The total increase
in replacements is given by integration on the interval [10,Tmax]. Al-
though the adjustment is not formalized here, we should expect that
this transitory eﬀect does not occur instantaneously due to the time
it takes search and buy a new car and possible temporary shortages,
induced by the large increase in demand associated to the replacement
scheme.
To compute the transitory eﬀect we use equation [14]. Let us call
this the model simulation. We take as the aggregate stock of cars,
N (t0), the average for the period 1988–1993 for cars between age 0
and 28, evaluated at the beginning of the second quarter of 1997 —
note that we are assuming that the stock grows at rate n = 0.04.
This computation aﬀords 163,541 car replacements, which reﬂects all
the cars in the economy whose age is higher than 10, the threshold,
and higher than the new optimal replacement age. This represents an
increase of about 16% over total sales given by equation [8] in steady
state.
It must be noted that there is a negative initial eﬀect which is ignored
in the previous computation, due to the behavior of types θ ≤ θ ≤ θ
who optimally delay replacement. For each one of these types, the
transitory eﬀect consists in a temporary postponement in replacements
from t0 to t0+10−T (θ;α0). The omission does not aﬀect our compu-
tation as it is only a temporary delay that almost disappears before the
end of 1998, which is the horizon we are taking to evaluate the trans-
itory eﬀect. If we denote as T the replacement age without subsidy of
the indiﬀerent owner θ, once the value of θ is calculated according to
Lemma A3.1 in Appendix A3, this age is computed as T = T (θ;α0)
and is equal to 8.23 years. Therefore, cars that before the subsidy
were replaced at an age T ∈ [8.23,10], delay their replacement during
a period of time equal to 10 − T. This means that almost all of them
are replaced before the end of 1998 and only those aged from 8.23
to 8.25 delay their replacement to January, 1999. But note that, in
the stationary state before the subsidy, our model predicts that only
33,899 cars are scrapped between age 8.23 and 10.
7For T ≥ T, the corresponding type θ is higher under α1 that under α0. The min con-
dition takes into account that types with θ > θmax are not aﬀected by the replacement
scheme.
17In fact, the Prever scheme does not aﬀect the stationary stock, but
the observed stock. Therefore, as we have data on deregistrations, we
can use this evidence to check the accuracy of our predictions. We
do this by trying to answer the following question: How many car
deregistrations would be observed without the Prever scheme? Let
us call counterfactual simulation the computation we make to answer
this question. This exercise confronts two diﬃculties: we do not have a
criterion to delimit the period over which the transitory eﬀect extends,
and we do not know how the hazard rate would have been without
the Prever scheme. Concerning the former, as an approximation, we
assume that the transitory eﬀect spreads over 1997 and 1998. As for
the latter, in order to extrapolate the trend of the pre–subsidy period,
we project car deregistrations for 1997 applying the stationary hazard
h(T;α0) to the observed stock of cars at the end of 1996 for T = I
with I = {1,2,...,28}, and to 1997 car registrations for I = 0. We
interpolate using cubic splines for values of T diﬀerent from I. This
allows us to estimate counterfactual deregistrations for 1997 and the
stock at the end of this year. Then, we use this stock and the stationary
hazard rate again to compute deregistrations during 1998, using also
observed car sales in 1998 for I = 0 —the results for the stock are
shown in Figure 9. The total number of deregistrations so calculated
for 1997 and 1998, for cars aged 10 or more, were 803,969. We subtract
this number from actual data on scrapping for cars aged 10 or more
in both years—a total of 896,486 cars were actually deregistered along
these two years—, giving a counterfactual simulation of the eﬀect of
Prever on car replacement of 92,517 cars for the period 1997–1998. If
we compare this result with that of the model simulation, the latter —
163,541 cars— is higher concluding that, according to this comparison,
our model may be overestimating the transitory eﬀect of Plan Prever.
INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE
The previous comparison must be taken carefully. Note that to com-
pute the transitory eﬀect in the model simulation, we are implicitly
using the stationary stock as well as the stationary hazard. In con-
trast, in the counterfactual simulation results are computed as the
diﬀerence between actual and stationary hazard rates applied to the
observed stock. However, this analysis provides some interesting in-
sights on the factors conditioning the eﬃcacy of the policy.
The discrepancies between both simulations can be attributable to
two factors: i) our model implies an excessive reduction in the optimal
18replacement age compared to the observed one and, ii) the number of
cars older than 10 is higher in the model stationary stock. To check
item i), we can compare the hazard rate resulting from the transitory
eﬀect with the observed average for 1997–1998 as well as the average for
1988–1993 used in the counterfactual simulation. All these functions
are shown in Figure 10. The hazard rate implied by the transitory
eﬀect is computed by assuming that this transitory eﬀect splits evenly
between 1997 and 1998 –see equation [A4.8] in Appendix A4. Figure
10 clearly shows that our computation overestimates the increase in
hazard rates for age between 10 and 20 years. Concerning point ii)
above, looking at Figure 9 we see that, although the stationary stock
is slightly higher than the observed stock from age 10 to 15, it is
considerably lower for almost all the remaining relevant values of age.
Therefore, the overestimation does not seem to be caused by diﬀerences
in the stock, but by an excessive reduction in the optimal replacement
age implied by our model, which generates an excessive increase in the
hazard rates.
INSERT FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE
Two key assumptions may underlie the referred overestimation of the
transitory eﬀect of the Prever scheme: the absence of a second hand
market and the assumption of a constant physical depreciation rate.
Figure 10 shows that for age between 10 and 14 the observed hazard
for 1997–1998 does not diﬀer too much from the average 1988–1993.
Moreover, for age between 20 and 28 the 1997–1998 average does not
diﬀer from the predicted hazard with transitory eﬀect. It may be
that the second hand market dominates the subsidy incentive up to
age 14, operates partially from age 14 to 20, and is dominated by
the replacement subsidy for higher values of age. It may also be that
observed scrapping up to age 14 is basically physical depreciation,
with an increasing depreciation rate. Consequently, the Prever scheme
inﬂuences the hazard for age larger than 14 only.
Concerning the permanent eﬀect, in the long run the number of cars
replaced at any time t that would not have been replaced without
subsidy —the permanent eﬀect— is



















19where the integrand is, for each type, the diﬀerence between station-
ary car sales after and before the subsidy. The integral is deﬁned over
the range of types θ aﬀected by the policy. This computation aﬀords
14,509 additional car replacements of owners who are advancing their
replacement, and a reduction in replacement of 2,155 cars caused by
replacement delays. The net eﬀect of 12,354 additional car replace-
ments represents an increment of 1.2% in total sales.
Finally, we compute the inﬂuence of the Prever scheme on the station-
ary average age of the stock. The age distribution of cars older than
28 years is not available. Therefore, we are forced to compute this
moment conditional on cars below 29 years of age —see Appendix A4
for details. We ﬁnd that the subsidy reduces the average age of the
stock from 8.7 to 8 years.
5.1. Robustness
To investigate the sensitivity of the model to a particular parameter,
we recalibrate ζ (θ) after changing it and simulate the policy. Con-
cerning ρ, we have performed simulations with ρ = 0.12 and ρ = 0.05.
Under the former value, the predicted transitory eﬀect of Prever rises
to 179,484, an increase of 9.7% with respect to the 163,541 predicted
with ρ = 0.08, and the permanent eﬀect rises also by 12.6% to 13,922.
When ρ = 0.05, the predicted transitory eﬀect is 7.7% lower than in
the benchmark case and the permanent eﬀect is also reduced by 10%.
We also ﬁnd that an increase in the pre–subsidy scrapping value from
d0 = 0.012 to d0 = 0.024, increases the transitory eﬀect by 1.2% and
the permanent eﬀect by 1.3%. If instead, the subsidy is introduced
with a pre–subsidy scrapping value d0 = 0.06, the transitory eﬀect
increases by 5.1% and the permanent eﬀect by 5.6%. If we calibrate
ζ (θ) using the mean deregistration hazard function for 1994–1996 in-
stead of 1988–1993 —other parameters at their original levels—, the
transitory eﬀect increases by 5.5% and the permanent eﬀect by 7.8%.
Concerning the failure rate, if we take δ = 0.01 —around ten times
the original value—, the transitory eﬀect is reduced by 10% and the
permanent eﬀect increases by 4%.
Our calibration of hazard rates revealed that a large part of scrapped
cars are never deregistered. However, it could be argued that the in-
troduction of a replacement scheme induces a larger fraction of car
owners to deregister. Although there is no evidence to test this hypo-
20thesis, we can make a robustness analysis. Let us assume that 20%
of type–inﬁnity car owners change their behavior after the subsidy is
introduced, so that they deregister their cars now. Let assume that
they are distributed in [0,θmax] as the existing population. In this
case, both the transitory and permanent eﬀects increase by 17%.
6. Final Remarks
The model described in this paper allows for an evaluation of the eﬀects
of car replacement subsidies. On the theoretical side, it matches ob-
served aggregate hazard rates starting from heterogeneous endogenous
replacement decisions. It also highlights the fact that the presence of
a threshold age in the replacement scheme induces a delay in replace-
ment for some consumers. On the empirical side, we are able to make
a quantitative evaluation of the Prever scheme introduced in Spain in
1997. Although our model seems to overestimate the short run eﬀects
of the Prever scheme, in the long run the increase in car sales pre-
dicted by our model is very small. Finally, we ﬁnd that the subsidy
reduces the average age of the stock of cars, as expected, although the
reduction is small.
It is necessary, however, to make some remarks about the simpliﬁca-
tions implied by the main assumptions. As it stands, the model em-
bodies ﬁve major simpliﬁcations: there is no second–hand car market,
the physical depreciation rate is age independent, the parameters af-
fecting the optimal scrapping age are constant —except for the change
in the scrapping value caused by the subsidy—, cars have no running
or maintenance costs, and the transitory eﬀect is instantaneous.
Ignoring the second–hand car market and assuming a time independ-
ent physical depreciation rate may be the main reasons for the model
to be overestimating the eﬀects of the Prever scheme, which only sub-
sidizes the simultaneous purchase of a new car and deregistration of
an old one. A more accurate estimate would be possible if informa-
tion were available concerning the number of transactions and prices
of cars of diﬀerent age in the second–hand market. Also, considera-
tion of the second–hand market would be desirable for evaluation of
the consequences of making the subsidy available to all deregistered
cars, whether or not deregistration is accompanied by purchase of a
new car, because this measure would raise prices in the second–hand
market and hence stimulate the replacement of newer as well as older
cars.
21The function T (θ;α), which is constant in the present model, must
in reality change over time, not only because of the time–dependence
of some parameters in α —ignored in the present model—, but also
because of such unmodelled factors as income shocks and employment
stability.
Consideration of running and maintenance cost not only reﬁnes the
model for analysis of schemes like Prever, but is essential for its ap-
plication to the analysis of the eﬀects on car sales and deregistration
of changes in oil taxes or inspection standards.8
Finally, it would be desirable to take into account the various factors
responsible for the transitory eﬀect of Prever–like schemes not being
instantaneous, as can be adjustment cost either on the demand or
supply side of the market.
Appendixes
A1. Data
To compute the hazard rates, hτ(I), as deﬁned in Section 2, we use published
yearly data by the Direcci´ on General de Tr´ aﬁco (DGT). Data are given at
December 31st and for one–year periods. We have two options to compute
hτ(I).
On the one hand, for each year, statistical bulletins from DGT report data
on the stock of cars classiﬁed by age between age 0 and 9, from 1969 to 1982.
From 1984 onward, the age ranges from 0 to 21.9 This allows us to compute




τ−1(I − 1), ∀ τ ≥ 1984, ∀ I = 0,1,2,...,21, [A1.1]






On the other hand, from 1970 onward, the DGT publishes data on new
car registrations, Mτ, as well as car deregistrations Bτ(I) classiﬁed by age
8The introduction of compulsory inspection in 1987 had a major eﬀect on replacement
—see Licandro and Sampayo (1997a) and Moral Rinc´ on (1998).
9These data are not available for 1983.
22between age 0 and a maximum age that varies from year to year but being
always higher than 30. This allows us to compute the stock for each year as
Pτ(0) = Mτ − Bτ(0), ∀ τ ≥ 1970,
P1970(I) = Pr
1969(I − 1) − B1970(I), ∀ I = 1,...,10,
Pτ(I) = Pτ−1(I − 1) − Bτ(I), ∀ τ > 1970, ∀ I = 1,...,τ − 1960.

    
    
[A1.2]
hτ(I) can be computed as
Bτ(I)
Pτ−1(I−1).
The second option is more useful as, for high values of τ, the stock is available
for values of age higher than 21. For instance, in 1988 we can compute the
stock classiﬁed by age between 0 and 28. Instead, if we use the ﬁrst option,
we have only the stock between age 0 and 21. It must be noted that, even
for age less than 22, Pτ(I) computed using [A1.2] and Pr
τ(I) are not the same
from 1983 onward. In general, it happens that, for τ > 1983, Pτ(I) < Pr
τ(I)
when I ≤ 10, and Pτ(I) > Pr
τ(I) when I ≥ 10. In the aggregate we have
Pτ > Pr
τ. For example, P1996 = 15,223,454 and Pr
1996 = 14,753,809.
Given the discrepancy mentioned above, we choose the second option as the
ﬁrst would only allow the computation of hτ(I) for values of I lower that
22, leaving aside from the analysis an age range that is probably strongly
aﬀected by the policy under study.
A2. The Replacement Problem Without Subsidy
Under the assumptions of Section 3.1, consumers solve the following problem



















A(t) − (p − d0), k = 1,2,... [A2.3]
a(tk) = T [A2.4]
da(t) =

−T if t = tk, k = 1,2,...
dt + dq otherwise [A2.5]
dq =

T − a(t) with probability δ dt,
0 with probability (1 − δ) dt, [A2.6]
A(0),a(0) given,
where A(t) denotes ﬁnancial wealth, a(t) durable’s age, θ the idiosyncratic
taste parameter and c(t) nondurables consumption. The rate of time prefer-
ence is denoted as ρ, and γ is the embodied rate of durable goods technical
23progress. The exogenous instantaneous income and interest rate are y and
r, respectively. We denote as p the price of new durable goods and as d0
the scrapping value, both exogenous. We assume d0 < p reﬂecting partial
irreversibility in purchases which, joint with the absence of second hand mar-
kets, generates infrequent replacement. Finally, k is an index for successive
replacements.
Equations [A2.2] and [A2.3] represent the budget constraint where nondur-
ables consumption is chosen continuously, and car replacement is chosen at
random discrete times tk motivated by partial irreversibility of car purchases.
Equation [A2.4] deﬁnes the optimal replacement age T. Equations [A2.5] and
[A2.6] reﬂect the evolution of age as a Poisson process, capturing the idea
that at each time with a probability δ, the car age reaches the value T that
renders the car wasteful and must be replaced by a new one. That is, the
age evolution is composed of two eﬀects: a deterministic one, where the age
evolves with time if a failure does not happen, and a stochastic process rep-
resented by q with dq following a Poisson process reﬂecting the fact that,
with probability δ, the car crashes and it is scrapped. T is endogenous and
deﬁnes the optimal replacement age in the sense that if the car does not suﬀer
a breakdown from age zero to T, it will be replaced optimally at this latter
age. So we represent a failure as if it suddenly increases the age to the value
where it is optimal to replace the car. In spite of the linearity of the problem,
unappealing corner solutions on c(t) are not considered, and next we look at
conditions for an interior solution to apply.
Note that the problem only depends on time through the discount rate ρ−γ so
that it is stationary. This was made possible by both the inclusion of the term
eγt into the individual valuation of nondurable goods, and the consideration
of a stationary stochastic process —a Poisson process— for the underlying
uncertainty. Besides the simpliﬁcation of the problem, this will allows us to
get a constant replacement age for cars. The stationarity and recursivity of
the problem makes possible to apply the Bellman principle of optimality to
get:
W (A,a) = max{V (A,a),J (A,a)}, [A2.7]
where J (A,a) is the value of scrapping the car and is given by10
(ρ − γ)J (A,a) = max
c
{θc + 1 [A2.8]
+ J0
a (A,a) + J0
A (A,a)(y + rA − c)}.
V (A,a) is the value of keeping the car and is given by:
(ρ − γ)V (A,a) = max
c

θc + e−γa + δ [J (A,a) − V (A,a)] [A2.9]
+ V 0
a (A,a) + V 0
A (A,a)(y + rA − c)}.
10In deriving Bellman equations, we follow Dixit and Pindyck (1994). For what
follows, note that when no failure takes place, da
dt = 1.
24Both equations are subject to constraints [A2.4]–[A2.6].
If c(A,a) is the interior solution for problems [A2.8] and [A2.9], the following
ﬁrst order conditions must be veriﬁed:
θ = J0
A (A,a) [A2.10]
θ = V 0
A (A,a). [A2.11]
Applying the envelope theorem to [A2.8] and [A2.9] gives
(ρ − γ)J0
A (A,a) = J0
A (A,a)r [A2.12]
+J00
AA (A,a)(y + rA − c(A,a))
+J00
aA (A,a)
(ρ − γ)V 0
A (A,a) = δ [J0
A (A,a) − V 0
A (A,a)] [A2.13]
+V 0
A (A,a)r + V 00
AA (A,a)(y + rA − c(A,a))
+V 00
aA (A,a).
The implicit function theorem allows us to diﬀerentiate [A2.10] and [A2.11],
resulting that all derivatives of functions J and V of order higher than one
are equal to zero. Therefore, from equations [A2.12] and [A2.13] we obtain
that ρ − γ = r. The other way around: if this equality applies, an interior
solution for nondurables consumption can be obtained. Hereafter we will
assume that this equality holds.
Now, we solve the problem. Integrating [A2.2] for each non replacement time















(A(tk) + (p − d0))e−r(tk−tk−1)
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R tk














Ruling–out Ponzi schemes, limk→∞e−rtkA(tk) = 0, resulting
Z ∞
0
c(t)e−rtdt + (p − d0)
∞ X
k=1




This is the realized budget constraint. But, given that successive replace-
ment times are random, at time 0 the budget constraint must be veriﬁed in
expected value. Computing expectations in the previous equation gives:
Z ∞
0
c(t)e−rtdt + (p − d0)E0
∞ X
k=1




as only scrapping times are random and the right hand side is deterministic.
Given the linearity of the utility function and the assumption r = ρ − γ,
the nondurables consumption path is determined as a residual after durable
goods spending, and the ﬁnancial wealth can be ignored as a state variable in
the replacement problem. These assumptions joint with the absence of credit
constraints make it possible to write the intertemporal budget constraint as
we do and to ignore the consumer income in the objective function. Therefore,
we substitute constraint [A2.14] into the objective function and the following
problem results:







k=1 e−(ρ−γ)tk	 , [A2.15]
subject to [A2.4], [A2.5] and [A2.6], and with a given at t = 0.
To solve [A2.15], we again take advantage of stationarity and recursivity, and
reformulate the problem as follows:
W (a) = max{V (a),J (a)}, [A2.16]
where, as before, V (a) denotes the value function if no replacement takes
place and J (a) the value of replacing a car of age a. This formulation corres-
ponds to problem [A2.7] after removing wealth as a state variable. Assuming
diﬀerentiability of the value function, if the car is not replaced, equation












26If the car becomes worthless for use, it must be scrapped and a new car
bought at cost θ(p − d0). From [A2.15], at some replacement time tk the
value of owning a car of age a, J (a), must be equal to the value of a new car,
V (0), minus the replacement cost. Therefore, the value of replacing a failed
car of age a, is given by J (a) = V (0) − θ(p − d0). Taking this into account,
the following diﬀerential equation results:
V (a) =
e−γa
ρ + δ − γ
+
1





ρ + δ − γ
[V (0) − θ(p − d0)],






ρ + δ − γ
(V (0) − θ(p − d0)) + Ce(ρ+δ−γ)a. [A2.19]
Evaluating this expression at a = 0, gives
V (0) =
(ρ + δ − γ)
(ρ + δ)(ρ − γ)
+





θ(p − d0). [A2.20]


















To solve the value function V (a), the replacement age T and the constant of
integration C must be determined. To this end, we use the “boundary value”
and “smooth pasting” conditions —see Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Note that
problem [A2.16] can be written as
W (a) = max{V (a),V (0) − θ(p − d0)}. [A2.22]
This gives the following boundary value condition
V (T) = V (0) − θ(p − d0). [A2.23]










C + θ(p − d0) = 0. [A2.24]
On the other hand, the smooth pasting condition in this problem is the
following11
V 0
a (T) = 0.
11Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provide an heuristic derivation of the “smooth pasting”
condition. This condition establishes that V (T) and V (0) − θ(p − d0) which are,
respectively, the value of keeping and replacing a car aged T, must meet tangentially





27To compute this equation, we compute the derivative in [A2.21] and evaluate




e−γT + (ρ + δ − γ)Ce(ρ+δ−γ)T = 0. [A2.25]
The solution to the equations system [A2.24] and [A2.25] gives C and T (θ;α0).
The later deﬁnes the optimal replacement age as a function of parameters
and is shown in equation [2] in Section 3.1.
A2.1. Existence of an Optimal Replacement Age
To assure that T (θ;α0) as deﬁned in [3] is the solution to the replacement
problem, we must prove that: i) the value function is decreasing as a function
of age; ii) it is optimal to own a car during some time interval, and iii) exists
a ﬁnite value of a for which it is optimal to replace the car.
The ﬁrst assertion is true if and only if V (a) ≥ V (0) − θ(p − d0) for a ∈
[0,T (θ;α0)] and V (a) decreases monotonically in the same interval. To verify
the monotonicity of the value function, we diﬀerentiate V (a) into equation
[A2.21] resulting that the value function is decreasing if and only if
C ≤
γe−(δ+ρ)a
(δ + ρ)(δ + ρ − γ)
, [A2.26]











Using [2] to substitute θ(p − d0) we have
C =
γe−(δ+ρ)T(θ;α0)
(δ + ρ)(δ + ρ − γ)
. [A2.28]
The inequality [A2.26] reduces to
e−(δ+ρ)T(θ;α0)
δ + ρ − γ
≤
e−(δ+ρ)a
δ + ρ − γ
,
which holds for a ∈ [0,T (θ;α0)] if and only if γ < ρ + δ.
Moreover, given that the value function is decreasing during the tenure in-
terval and that p > d0, it is clear that V (a) ≥ V (0) − θ(p − d0) for all
a ∈ [0,T (θ;α0)], resulting T (θ;α0) ≥ 0 and T (θ;α0) = 0 if and only if θ = 0.
Therefore, for a ∈ [0,T (θ;α0)) —known as the “continuation region”—, it is
optimal to keep the car and a = T (θ;α0) is the replacement age.
28Finally, we prove that T (θ;α0) < ∞ if and only if θ < 1
(δ+ρ)(p−d0). From
[A2.20] and [A2.21],







+ θ(p − d0).
Using [A2.28] to replace C results
V (a) − [V (0) − θ(p − d0)] =
e−γa − 1
δ + ρ






(δ + ρ)(δ + ρ − γ)
.
Taking limits when T (θ;α0) → ∞,
lim
T(θ;α0)→∞







− θ(p − d0)

.
This expression shows that if T (θ;α0) < ∞ then θ(p − d0) < 1
δ+ρ. Otherwise,
this limit can be positive no matter how high a is, contradicting the existence
of a ﬁnite T (θ;α0). Conversely, if θ(p − d0) < 1
δ+ρ there is some a < ∞ such
that for a > a this limit takes a negative value, which proves the existence of
a ﬁnite value of T (θ;α0).
The conditions assuring that 0 ≤ T (θ;α0) < ∞ are stated under Assump-
tions 1 and 2 in Section 3.1.
A3. The Replacement Problem with Subsidy
With the subsidy, the maximization problem of Appendix A2 remains un-













; k = 1,2,...
where I
 











1 if a(tk) ≥ T
0 otherwise.
Taking this into account, the reasoning of Appendix A2 can be reproduced
here and the maximization problem now is the following:



















29subject to the same constraints as in problem [A2.15] in Appendix A2. The
recursive formulation of this problem is given also by equation [A2.16] in





V (0) − θ(p − d0) if a < T
V (0) − θ(p − d0 − s) if a ≥ T.
[A3.1]
The following Lemma establishes the existence of a type θ which is indiﬀerent
between taking advantage of the subsidy or not.




= T. Without sub-
sidy, types θ < θ where replacing at age T (θ;α0) < T. With subsidy these
owners have two alternatives: keep their behavior given by T (θ;α0) without
taking beneﬁt of the subsidy or delay the replacement to age T to get the
subsidy. Let V (a,θ) and V ∗ (a,θ) deﬁne, respectively, the value of a car
aged a if the replacement age continues to be T (θ;α0) or is just T, for θ < θ.
Therefore, there exist a unique type θ < θ such that V (a,θ) = V ∗ (a,θ).






Proof. From Figure 4 the replacement age increases monotonically with
respect to θ. Therefore, at the time of the subsidy implementation the re-





delay the replacement to age T, in order to receive the subsidy. However,
it is necessary to check if it is proﬁtable to assume the cost implied by this
decision.12 To this end, we ﬁrst compute the value function without subsidy



















(δ + ρ)(δ + ρ − γ)
,
where T (θ;α0) is given by [2] in Section 3.1. On the other hand, if the owner






















12Note that, in contrast, for θ ≥ θ the advance in replacement is not a prerequisite to
receive the subsidy but it is a response. Taking advantage of the subsidy has no cost.
30which is similar to [A2.21] in Appendix A1, except that now the boundary
of the problem is exogenously given at T. As the replacement age is given




= V ∗ (0,θ) − θ(p − d0 − s), with V ∗  
T,θ

and V ∗ (0,θ) given by




















θ(p − d0) [A3.4]
+















Finally, to see which owners want to delay their replacement in order to
take advantage of the subsidy, we compute the diﬀerence V ∗ (a,θ)−V (a,θ),
with V ∗ (a,θ) given by [A3.4] and V (a,θ) given by [A3.2]. Let Ω(a,θ) =
V ∗ (a,θ) − V (a,θ). Next, we prove the following:














































dθ is computed from [2] in Section 3.1 and substituted into the

































If, to compute [A3.2], equation [A2.27] is substituted into [A2.21] —























(ρ + δ)(ρ − γ)
.

















Therefore, denoting as θ the type that solves equation Ω(a,θ) = 0, if a
solution exists, we have that θ < θ, and some owners optimally delay
their replacement to take advantage of the subsidy.


























For T > 0 the previous limit is negative if and only if
eγT − 1
e(δ+ρ)T − eγT <
γ
δ + ρ − γ
,
which is always the case provided that γ < ρ + δ is veriﬁed.
Therefore, from i), ii) and iii) we can apply Bolzano theorem so that a
unique value θ exists such that 0 < θ < θ, and can be found as the solution
to the equation Ω(a,θ) = 0. This is a nonlinear equation whose solution
in θ is independent of a —as can be seen in [A3.5]—, and must be solved
numerically. Moreover, if T = 0, the limit computed in iii) is equal to zero
showing that θ = 0 is the solution.
Proof (of Proposition 2). Lemma 1 establishes the replacement age for
θ ≤ θ. It remains to analyze the replacement for θ ≥ θ. As, from Proposition
321, the replacement age is inversely related to the scrapping subsidy, θ < θ.





= T. In this case, the replacement decision is a free bound-
ary problem equivalent to that solved in Appendix A2 but with diﬀerent
boundary conditions that now are:
V (T) = V (0) − θ(p − d0 − s)
V 0





where V is given by [A2.21] with p − d0 − s replacing p − d0. Solving this
pair of equations as we did without subsidy, the resulting replacement age is





is analyzed. Cars owned by these types have an
age higher than T at the time of the introduction of the subsidy. But, if their
problem were solved using equations [A3.7] the replacement age with subsidy
would be lower than T, given the deﬁnition of θ. Therefore, if they want to
take advantage of the subsidy, they must replace at age T. To see if it pays
to do that, the value of replacing at age T that was previously computed and
is given by [A3.4], must be compared with the value of not taking advantage
of the subsidy. This latter value was computed in [A3.2] and the diﬀerence


















= 0. Moreover, the derivative of
equation [A3.6] with respect to θ is,
∂2Ω(a,θ)
∂θ2 = −







That is, Ω(a,θ) is equal to zero for θ and θ, positive for θ and strictly concave









that it is also optimal to replace at age T in this interval.
A4. Aggregate Hazard Rates and the Population Distribution
As noted in Section 4.1, the stationary density function for car sales is deﬁned
as m(θ;α0) =
M(t,θ;α0)
M(t;α0) , for θ ∈ [0,θmax], with total sales M(t;α0) and each
type purchases M(t,θ;α0) deﬁned in [8] and [9] respectively. Starting from




1 − e−(δ+n) T(θ;α0)−1








1 − e−(δ+n) T(θ;α0)
−1
dθ.




1 − e−(δ+n) T(θ;α0)








1 − e−(δ+n) T(θ;α0)

dθ, [A4.2]
and M(θmax;α0) is the distribution function corresponding to the density
m(θ;α0) evaluated at θmax.





where T is the car age, P(t,T;α0) is the number of cars of age T on the stock
at time t, and B(t,T;α0) is the number of cars of age T deregistered during
some short period [t,t + dt]. P(t,T;α0) and B(t,T;α0) are related through
B(t,T;α0) ≡












Note that by the deﬁnition of age T, dT = dt. Since individuals with θ <




M(t − T,θ;α0) e−δT dθ [A4.5]
+M(t − T,∞;α0)e−δT.
Under stationarity, equation [A4.5] becomes
P(t,T;α0) = e−(n+δ)TM(t;α0)(1 − M(θ(T;α0);α0)). [A4.6]
From equation [A4.4],
B(t,T;α0) = δP(t,T;α0) + e−(n+δ)T M(t;α0)f (T;α0), [A4.7]
where
f(T;α0) = m(θ(T;α0);α0)θ0(T;α0),
is the density m after using the variable change θ(T;α0). Substituting [A4.6]
and [A4.7] into equation [A4.3], results




34To compare our simulation results with data in Section 5, we use the transit-
ory hazard rate just after Plan Prever, under the assumption that the trans-
itory eﬀect splits evenly between 1997 and 1998. Let us denote this hazard
as hTE (T). To compute this function, it must be taking into account that,










at age T. Therefore, using deﬁnition [A4.3], if the subsidy is introduced at
time t0, hTE (T) is given by
hTE (T) =

            
            
h(T;α0) if T < T (θ;α0)














P(t0,T;α0) if T > T,
[A4.8]
where TE(T;α0,α1) is given by [14] in Section 5.
Finally expression [A4.6] can be used to compute the stationary average age of
the stock of cars with subsidy, reported in Section 5. Denoting as p(T;α0) =
P(t,T;α0)
N(t) the per capita stock of cars aged T, this function integrates less
than one in the interval [0,T (θmax;α0)] because, as it is observed in the main
text, M(θmax;α0) < 1. Since the distribution of age for higher values than
T (θmax;α0) is unknown, we are forced to compute the average age of the
stock conditional on the age being less than T (θmax;α0). If p(α0) denotes
the integral of the function p(T;α0) over the interval [0,T (θmax;α0)], the





T p(T;α0) dT .
With subsidy, the stationary stock p(T;α1) is given by
p(T;α1) =

     
     
e−(n+δ)T M(t;α1)
N(t) (1 − M(θ(T;α1);α1)) if T < T
e−(n+δ)T M(t;α1)
N(t) (1 − M(θ;α1)) if T ≤ T < T
e−(n+δ)T M(t;α1)
N(t) (1 − M(θ(T;α1);α1)) if T ≥ T,
where M(t;α1) is given by [8] using α1 instead of α0 and T is deﬁned as
T = T(θ;α0). M(θ(T;α1)) is the distribution function whose correspond-
ing density is given by [A4.1] with α1 replacing α0. Note that the subsidy
35makes the function m(θ;α1) to be a mixed discrete–continuous function that




and accumulates a mass at point θ.
Consequently function M(θ;α1) is discontinuous at this point and the stock
is also discontinuous at the corresponding age, T.






where T (θmax;α1) < T (θmax;α0) and p(α1) is given by the integral of the
function p(T;α1) over the interval [0,T (θmax;α1)].
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Actual registrations, deregistrations and stock growth: average
1988–1993, average 1994–1996, 1997 and 1998.
1988–1993 1994–1996 1997 1998
%stock %stock %stock %stock
New car registrations 8.2 6.3 6.8 7.7
Stock growth 4.5 3.1 3.9 4.5
Cars scrapped (deregistered) 3.6 3.2 3.1 3.4
38Figure 1
Observed aggregate hazard rates for car replacement in Spain
1993–1996
39Figure 2
Observed hazard rates for several years in Spain
40Figure 3
Growth rate of the stock of cars for 1988–1998 and its
composition
41Figure 4
Optimal replacement age as a function of θ, before and after the
subsidy. The parameter values for this Figure are: p = 1,
d0 = 0.012, ρ = 0.08, γ = 3.1, δ = 0.0014. For the replacement
age with subsidy, s = 0.048. Both functions are identical for
θ < θ
42Figure 5
Calibrated deregistration hazard function h(T;α0) (line) and
observed Spanish car deregistration hazard rates averaged over
the period 1988–1993 (dots)
43Figure 6
Calibrated density function f(T;α0)
44Figure 7
Calibrated distribution of the car–owning population by θ
45Figure 8
Change in optimal replacement age induced by the replacement
scheme, as a function of pre–Prever optimal replacement age
46Figure 9
Observed age–wise distribution of car population on December
31st, 1996, simulation for December 31st, 1997 and stationary
stock
47Figure 10
Average observed hazard rates for 1988–1993, average for
1997–1998 and simulated hazard with transitory eﬀect
48